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It has been more than a quarter of a century since Becker, Landes and Michael 
(1977) published their pioneering study on the economics of marriage. The main 
implication of their theory is that maximization of marital incomes by men and 
women would induce strong segregation in the marriage market. Since then, a 
growing economics literature of theoretical and applied research has been successful 
in promoting a better understanding of family behaviour (for recent surveys, see 
Weiss (1997) and Ermisch (2003)). However, despite this well developed theoretical 
framework, and the motivation provided by the growth in divorce that has occurred 
over time across many countries, there are surprisingly few empirical studies of the 
determinants of partnership dissolution. 
In recent years, partly because of the dramatic growth of divorce amongst 
parents, child support (CS) has become a major policy issue. High rates of lone 
parenthood and low levels of child support have resulted in growing numbers of lone 
parents, almost all mothers, who rely on welfare. A dramatic reform was introduced in 
the UK in 1993 which created a Child Support Agency which, for the first time, 
mandated child support payments. However, the levels of child support liabilities 
were often extremely high and accumulated arrears frequently amounted to thousands 
of pounds. Moreover, the reform was implemented in a way that made no allowance 
for earlier agreed settlements, the incentives for many lone parents to seek child 
support was limited because of the interaction between CS and the welfare system, 
and the rules that determined the obligations were complex. Thus, the levels of 
compliance remained low and the costs of enforcement were high. A subsequent 
reform, that was not implemented until 2003, made the CS formula much simpler, 
reduced the interaction with the welfare system, and reduced typical liability levels.  
Separation has typically been associated with a large drop in income for the 
custodial parent and it is the purpose of obligatory child support to offset this. In 
Walker and Zhu (2003) we show how separation affects the distribution of 
equivalised incomes between parents and show how the level of child support 
requirements, and compliance with them, affects this redistribution. However, child 
support not only changes the nature of the payoffs to spouses should separation occur. 
By raising the financial obligation of the absent parent, almost always the father, child 
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support raises the costs of separation to the absent parent1. However, child support 
also lowers the cost of separation to the custodial parent, almost invariably the 
mother. Thus, in addition to providing for a redistribution of resources should 
separation occur, child support obligations, to the extent that they exceed what would 
otherwise have occurred, also changes the incentive to separate.  
Since child support will generally generate greater separation disincentives for 
fathers and greater incentives for mothers the net effect is unclear a priori. However, 
child support often interacts with welfare receipts for poor households and, in some 
cases, child support payments may be tax deductible and hence will interact with the 
tax system. Thus, it will often be the case that net payments of child support may not 
equal net receipts and the difference will depend on individual circumstances in 
complicated ways. In general, because net payments and net receipts will not be 
equal, there will be implications of CS for the probability of parents separating and 
this paper is specifically concerned with the empirical modelling of how child support 
affects separation.  
Section 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3 explains the theoretical 
framework and Section 4 outlines the empirical specification. Section 5 presents the 
UK data and Section 6 focuses on the role of child support in partnership dissolution 
and explains how contemporaneous child support (and the present value of future) 
liabilities are constructed. Section 7 presents the results and interpretation while 
Section 8 analyses the implied separation rates under a child support criterion that is 
based on the income of the custodial parent compared to a criterion based on the 
income of both separated parents. Section 9 concludes and evaluates. 
2. Existing literature 
 There is an extensive literature that is concerned with the effect of welfare 
policies on separation. Moffitt (1992) surveys this literature and finds little support for 
the idea that separation is motivated by considerations of the potential welfare 
entitlements. Since then a number of papers have been stimulated by changes in US 
welfare rules that followed the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
 
1 Hereafter, we assume, for simplicity, that it is mothers who become the custodial parent, so fathers 
are liable for CS. 
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Reconciliation Act (PRWOA)2. An important study that postdates Moffitt’s survey is 
Eissa and Hoynes (1999) which exploits changes in the entitlements for the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), the major in-work transfer programme in the US. They 
show how the expansion in EITC has affected the incentives to have a partner and 
shows that the phase-in range of EITC encourages partnership and the phase-out 
discourages it. However, very few papers consider the role of child support explicitly. 
Hoffman and Duncan (1995) include predicted child support as a regressor in their 
model of divorce using US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data but find that 
it is statistically insignificant3. It is worth noting, however, that the predicted child 
support was based on the small subsample of 171 divorced women not receiving Aid 
for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the first two years post-divorce. 
 In the UK there is very little quantitative research on the economic 
determinants of separation. Recently Böheim and Ermisch (2001) studied partnership 
dissolution in the UK using the first eight waves of the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS). Using a discrete-time transition rate model, they estimate the 
probability of the union dissolving at time t as a function of the duration of the 
partnership as of t-1 and a vector of economic and partnership characteristics also 
measured at t-1. One major focus of the paper is on the differences between a couple’s 
expectations at t-2 of their financial situation in the following year and an evaluation 
of the realised outcome at t-1, as predictors of partnership dissolution. It is shown that 
couples experiencing unexpected improvements in finances have lower dissolution 
risks while couples experiencing negative shocks are at higher risks: a result which is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction that income “surprises” affect partnership 
dissolution.  
In this paper, we argue that the “surprises” highlighted in Böheim and Ermisch 
(2001) only capture changes in a couple’s economic circumstances within the 
 
2 See Bitler et al (2003) which examines the effects of the switch from AFDC to Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF) and of state waivers on flows into and out of marriage. Work on welfare 
system effects has recently been complemented by Gruber (2003) who exploits the move to unilateral 
divorce regulations to show a significant increase in the odds of an adult being divorced and of a child 
living with a divorced parent.  
 
3 Several papers investigate the role of child support on remarriage. Yun (1992) finds a positive effect 
of the availability of child support but a negative effect of actual payments. Beller and Graham (1993) 
and Hu (1994) find no significant effect of child support. 
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partnership. When people decide whether to continue the partnership into t from t-1, 
they would compare their potential net incomes after partnership dissolution with the 
status quo rather than look at changes in net incomes within the partnership, i.e. we 
assume that couples are forward looking rather than backward looking. Although the 
“surprises” might well be one of the factors that determine of the changes in net 
income arising from partnership dissolution, the former are nevertheless only a partial 
and indirect measure of the latter variable that directly enters the utility comparison 
framework (see Hoffman and Duncan (1995) and Weiss and Willis (1997) who use 
prediction errors from econometric estimates of one period ahead individual 
incomes).  
Child support is the key variable that links the net incomes before and after 
relationship dissolution for both partners. Indeed, when we abstract from any labour 
supply or repartnership effects on incomes, child support is the main factor that 
determines the changes in net incomes caused by the marital dissolution. Other 
factors, such as child custody and housing arrangements, only affect changes in net 
incomes through their impact on child support liabilities and receipts. Only two 
papers directly address this issue: Nixon (1997) uses Current Population Survey data 
and finds a statistically significant and positive relationship between marital status 
and child support enforcement, while Helm (2004) uses state-level data and exploits 
variation in child support enforcement over time and finds no significant effect. 
Neither paper explore the complex relationship between child support, taxes and 
transfers which serve to make liabilities and receipts differ. 
In this paper we use the prevailing child support rules set by the government to 
calculate, under plausible assumptions, the estimated child support liability and the 
implied levels of receipt, for each time period a couple is at risk of dissolution. Using 
the official adult equivalence scales (McClements (1977)) we then calculate the 
equalised net incomes for both partners pre and post dissolution of the relationship. 
Indeed, because separation is likely to be regarded as permanent, we also compute the 
present values of child support liabilities and receipts. 
Despite its popularity in the media, and to a lesser extent in the psychology 
and sociology literatures, the “empty nest syndrome” which refers to “feelings of 
depression, sadness, and/or grief experienced by parents and caretakers after children 
coming of age leave their childhood homes” (see http://www.psychologytoday.com/ ), 
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has drawn little attention from economists. The only exception appears to be 
Heidemann, Suhomlinova and O’Rand (1998), who have found that the onset of the 
“empty nest” stage increases the risk of marital disruption. However, their sample is 
households of middle-aged women from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature 
Women and their model does not take into account child support variables. This is 
important because child support liability usually only arises for dependent children (in 
the UK this is defined as under 17, or 19 if in further education) so that children 
leaving the nest empty (or, at least, less full) are associated with reductions in CS 
liability and receipt that changes the incentives.  
3. The Theory of Partnership Dissolution and the Econometric Model 
The seminal work in this area is Becker (1981) and Becker, Landes and 
Michael (1977). Their framework has served as the basis for much subsequent 
research – for example, Peters (1993), Moffitt (1990), Nixon (1997), and Weiss and 
Willis (1985). In the Becker framework divorce occurs if the combined utility of the 
partners is higher outside the partnership than inside.  So if U is utility (assumed to be 
transferable), D indicates divorced and M married (we ignore the possibility of 
cohabitation for the moment) and h and w indicate husband and wife, then divorce 
requires that  UDw+UDh  > UMw+UMh . Thus the change in utility should divorce occur 
is ∆UD= ∆UDh+ ∆UDw  which can be approximated by ∆UD= -λh .CL + λw .CR  where λ 
is the marginal utility of income, C is child support and L and R indicate liability and 
receipt, which can be different because of tax and welfare rules. In the absence of 
mandatory child support we might still expect altruistic parents to make transfers 
although the data typically suggests that this does not occur. 
In general, we cannot sign the total utility change but if CL = CR = C then ∆UD 
= (λw - λh) .C and if wives have lower incomes than husbands following divorce, so 
that λw > λh, then we would expect child support to increase the probability of divorce 
since the transfer would be worth more to the wife than to the husband4.  
If the wife expects to be on out-of-work welfare in the event of divorce then 
CR = 0, since the welfare system taxes child support at 100%. We would then expect 
 
4 We are assuming that prior to separation marginal utilities are equalised across spouses because 
individual incomes are pooled. 
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divorce to be unlikely since ∆UD = -λh .CL < 0, and this would be all the more unlikely 
the richer is the husband.   
Overall, we would expect divorce to be more likely between partners where 
the husband would have higher post-divorce income than the wife, since then we 
would expect (λw - λh) > 0. Moreover, if CL attracts tax relief, and the tax system is 
progressive, this would make divorce even more likely.  
However, even in these special cases there is a presumption that prior to 
divorce λw = λh because income is assumed to be pooled within intact households and 
it seems unlikely that divorce would occur in these circumstances, except because of 
unanticipated shocks. Thus, this framework is quite unlikely to be entirely 
comprehensive and, even if it were, its empirical implications are only unambiguous 
in special cases. Nevertheless, the framework is helpful for providing a structure for 
thinking through these issues. 
4. Empirical Specification 
The empirical analogue of the theoretical framework assumes that ∆UD is a 
latent variable and divorce then occurs, i.e. D =1, if this latent variable is positive and 
not, i.e. D = 0, otherwise. We estimate both a discrete-time transition rate model and 
hazard models. The discrete-time transition rate specification is used as a starting 
point, as it allows us to compare our results with those in the Böheim and Ermisch 
(2001) paper. We then extend the model by exploiting the variation in child support 
liabilities driven by an important policy reform, to separately identify the effects of 
children from the effect of child support. Moreover, we allow for the potential impact 
of the departure of all children (the empty nest effect) in our wider sample which also 
includes childless couples. We use this simple model to home in on a parsimonious 
specification which we then pursue using a duration modelling framework, which is 
less restrictive in its distributive assumptions than the simple transition probit.  
The discrete-time transition rate model used by Böheim and Ermisch (2001), 
has the desirable property that probability of survival at time period t only depends on 
survival probability upto period t-1 and a vector of explanatory variables also 
measured at t-1. Jenkins (1995) has shown that once the total elapsed duration is 
included in the model, one can use a standard probit model to get consistent parameter 
estimates of β in equation (1), due to the convenient cancelling result.  
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(1)  -1 -1 -1 -1Pr[ =1 |  ,  ]  ( ln( )   )it it it it itD X duration duration Xα β= Φ +  
where Ф denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution, ln(durationit-1) is the 
log duration of partnership of couple i as of t-1, and Xit-1 is a vector of explanatory 
variables also measured at t-1, and α and β are parameters of interest. Note that the 
assumption of residual homoscedasticity is standard practice in the literature (see 
Hoffman and Duncan (1995) and Weiss and Willis (1997)). 
 The hazard function offers a convenient way of defining duration dependence. 
Positive duration dependence means that the probability that a spell will end shortly 
increases as the spell increases in length. It specifies the instantaneous rate of failure 
at T = t conditional upon survival to time t as 
(2)  λ( ) lim Pr( | ) ( )
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where f(t) and S(t) are density and survival functions.  
 Here we are interested in estimating three of the most popular parametric 
survival distributions, namely the Exponential, the Weibull and the Lognormal 
parameterisations which allows for no duration dependence, monotonic and non-
monotonic duration dependence respectively. The Generalized Gamma Model is 
extremely flexible, nesting all three as special cases.  
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where 2| | ,   ( ){ln)( ) }/ ,   exp(| | ),  and ( )z sign t z zγ κ κ µ σ µ γ κ−= = − = Φ  is the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function and I(a,x) is the incomplete Gamma 
function (for details see, for example, Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) and Stata Corp 
(2003)). In other words, the Generalized Gamma distribution reduces to the Weibull 
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distribution when κ=1, to the exponential when κ=1 and σ=1, and to the lognormal 
case when κ=0. 
 The one parameter exponential distribution is widely used as a model for 
duration data. It is simple to work with and to interpret, and is often an adequate 
model for durations that do not exhibit much variation. The exponential distribution is 
obtained by taking the hazard function to be a constant, λ(t) = γ > 0, over the range of 
t. The instantaneous failure rate is independent of t so that the conditional chance of 
failure in a time interval of specified length, is exactly the same as the unconditional 
chance of failure. However, in empirical work, the exponential distribution is 
sometimes found to be less flexible in fitting data than one would like. The two 
parameter Weibull distribution is an important generalisation of the exponential 
distribution, which allows for a duration dependence of the hazard on time. The 
hazard function of the Weibull function is given by 
(4)   λ γ( )t pt p= −1       
where γ > 0 and p > 0. This hazard is monotonically decreasing for p < 1, increasing 
for p > 1, and reduces to the constant exponential hazard if p = 1. The shape of the 
hazard function depends critically on the value of p, which is sometimes called the 
shape parameter. As duration dependence is independent of the parameter γ, γ is 
sometimes known as the scale parameter. The probability function, the density 
function and the survival function are, respectively 
(5)   
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It is clear that the three parameterisations are general in different ways. The Cox 
proportional hazard model does not require any specific probability distribution for 
the survival times. However, when a Weibull or a lognormal distribution is 
appropriate for the observed survival data, the distinction between which depends on 





This paper uses a sample of couples, drawn from the BHPS, who are at risk of 
partnership dissolution in the forthcoming year having survived to that time, until they 
are either censored or the risk has materialised. BHPS is a nationally representative 
sample of some 5,500 households recruited in 1991, with around 10,000 original 
sample members (OSMs). These OSMs and their children, who also become OSMs 
after reaching 16, are interviewed each successive year, together with all adult 
members of their families, even if the OSMs split off from their original households 
to form new families and/or relocate to other areas of the UK. This sampling design 
ensures that the sample remains representative of the UK population over time. 
The core questionnaire of BHPS collects information on household 
organisation, housing, employment, education, health and incomes in all waves. In 
wave 2, BHPS also collected lifetime histories of marriage, cohabitation, and fertility 
and employment transitions, which allow us to construct spells in progress of the 
current relationship for all couples in our sample, despite the fact that we are unable to 
observe the partnerships from the time of their formation.    
The sample in this paper includes all women who were either married or 
cohabiting, and were aged 60 or less, at the time of the second wave. For people 
experiencing multiple relationship dissolutions over the sample period, we only focus 
on the first relationship. We include all cases where the couples are at risk of 
partnership dissolution in the forthcoming year and where the outcome can be either 
directly observed or imputed with certainty. This leaves us with 15,800 couple-years, 
of which 319 (just 2.0%) end up in dissolution. For presentation purposes, we choose 
the woman as the representative for a couple.   
Table 1 gives the means and standard deviations of continuous partnership 
characteristics by partnership outcomes. It suggests that women who start a 
partnership later in life are slightly less likely to dissolve their partnership while the 
elapsed partnership duration is negatively correlated with the risk of separation. The 
first finding seems to be consistent with the theoretical prediction that people who 
enter into a relationship early are more likely to regret the poor match arising to 
insufficient search. The indication that the probability of a partnership dissolving 
declines with elapsed partnership duration might reflect either heterogeneity, say in 
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risk aversion, or the hypothesis that couples invest in partnership-specific capital over 
time. Table 1 also shows that conditional on employment, there is hardly any 
difference between the net weekly earnings of women who experience a separation 
and women who remain in partnership. In contrast, women who continue their 
partnership have partners with higher earnings than those who separate, again 
conditional on male partners working. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the indicator variables used in the 
empirical model. Cohabiting couples are almost five times as likely to separate as 
legally married couples. This huge difference might reflect the difference in the level 
of commitment, or it might be due to difference in characteristics between these two 
groups. Note that for child support purposes, married and cohabiting couples are 
treated equally. Couples of the same ethnic group or religion are less likely to 
separate, a result consistent with the hypothesis of positive sorting by marriage. The 
presence of pre-school children is associated with higher risks. However, this is 
simple correlation and might capture the effect that households with younger children 
tend to have shorter relationship durations. 
The literature of the economics of marriage suggests that education is the main 
determinant of expected earnings and so it should be a key sorting device in 
partnership formation. Here, we find some evidence, consistent with the idea of 
assortative mating, that the difference in number of years of education between 
partners is important for dissolution. Figure 1 shows that the distribution in the 
difference id age left full-time education is symmetric with almost 30% of couples 
having exactly the same number of years of education and over half of all couples’  
Table 1:  Means (SD) of Continuous Variables by Partnership Outcome 
 Continue Dissolve 
Partnership Characteristics   
  Age at start of partnership 23.50 (5.80) 23.06 (5.96) 
  Log duration of partnershipt-1 2.76 (0.76) 2.10 (0.97) 
Age difference   
Woman’s age – partner’s age -2.52 (4.65) -2.55 (5.57) 
Labour Market   
  Net Labour incomet-1 175 (129) 170 (107) 
  Partner’s net labour incomet-1 346 (263) 314 (189) 
N (couple-years) 15481 319 
Note: Earnings are in £/week and in January 2004 prices (zero values excluded) 
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Partnership characteristics   
  Marriedt-1 (cohabitingt-1) 1.6 (7.6) 14631 (1169) 
  Partners are different (same) ethnic group 7.2 (1.9) 333 (15467) 
  Partners have different (same) religion 2.5 (1.6) 7426 (8374) 
  Youngest child <5(≥5) years at t-1 3.0 (1.8) 3084 (12716) 
Education   
  Degree 2.0 1426 
  Other higher 2.0 3570 
  A-levels 2.4 1348 
  O-levels 2.4 3841 
  Basic formal education 1.9 1799 
  No formal education 1.3 3650 
Partner has different (same) education level 2.0 (2.0) 11854 (3946) 
Partner’s Education   
  Degree 1.5 1893 
  Other higher 1.8 4348 
  A-levels 2.3 1727 
  O-levels 2.6 2641 
  Basic formal education 1.5 1300 
  No formal education 1.6 3103 
Labour market   
  Employedt-1 (not employedt-1) 2.0 (2.1) 10501 (5299) 
  Partner Employedt-1 (not employedt-1) 1.9 (2.4) 12287 (3513) 
  Receipt Income Support between t-2 and t-1 4.2 (1.8) 1156 (14644) 
Financial change indicators   
  Better financial situationt-1 1.9 4110 
  Same financial situationt-1 1.6 7635 
  Worse financial situationt-1 2.6 3901 
Partners view financial future differently (similarly) 2.4 (1.6) 6158 (9256) 
Surprise indicators (N=15555)   
  Large positive surprise 0.0 257 
  Positive surprise 1.4 2529 
  No surprise 1.6 7877 
  Negative surprise 2.3 3377 
  Large negative surprise 4.2 709 
Surprise missing 3.7 806 




Differences being no more than one year. Our data shows that, of couples with similar 
number of years of education (i.e. with a difference no more than one year), only 
1.7% separate each year compared to 2.3% of couples with larger (either positive or 
negative) differences.  
Employment of either partner is associated with lower risk of partnership 
dissolution while receipt of Income Support (the UK welfare programme for those 
with low income – in this case, mostly lone parents with little or no labour income) 
increases the risk. Interestingly, it is the couples who face the same financial situation 
as last year, rather than those experiencing improved financial outcomes that are 
having the lowest risks. As expected, couples experiencing worse outcomes and 
couples with different views on financial developments face higher risks.  









-10 -5 0 5 10
Differences in Years of Education
 
Following Böheim and Ermisch (2001), we also construct “surprise” variables, 
by comparing people’s expectations formed at t-2 of their financial situation at t-1 
with their evaluation of the actual outcomes at t-1, in order to test the hypothesis that 
new information affects partnership dissolution. Table 3 shows how the five 
“surprise” categories, i.e. large positive surprises, positive surprise, as expected, 
negative surprise and large negative surprises are defined respectively, together with 
the corresponding relative frequencies. Roughly half of all women correctly predict 
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their financial situations in the following year. Of the remaining half, more women 
seem to be over-optimistic (i.e. experiencing negative surprises) than to be over-
pessimistic (i.e. experiencing positive surprises). More importantly, there is a 
monotonic increase in the probability of partnership dissolution as we move from 
large positive  to large negative surprises. 
Table 3:  Expectations and realisations regarding financial situation 
Evaluationt-1 Expectationt-2 
Better off About the same Worse off 


















Note: ++ large positive surprise, + positive surprise, = as expected, - negative surprise, -- large negative 
surprise. Numbers in parentheses are relative frequencies. 
 
6. Child Support 
Concern about growing child poverty has motivated recent research on the 
impact of partnership dissolution on the incomes of households with children and on 
child welfare. The overwhelming evidence from the US has indicated a positive role 
for child support in reducing child poverty among lone parent families (see e.g. 
Bartfeld (2000), Del Boca and Flinn (1995), Meyer and Hu (1999) and Meyer 
(1993)). In the UK, Bingley, Symons and Walker (1995) and Bingley, Lanot, Symons 
and Walker (1995) investigate the potential effects of the proposed Child Support 
reform on net incomes and labour supply of lone mother headed households. More 
recently, Paull et al (2000) investigate the potential effects of the proposed child 
support reform on net incomes and labour supplies of lone mother headed households. 
Despite its apparent importance, there appears to be no research that analyses 
the impact of potential CS liabilities on partnership dissolution in the literature so far. 
CS is the key variable that links the net incomes before and after relationship 
dissolution for both partners. Indeed, when we abstract from any labour supply or 
repartnership effects, child support is the main factor that determines the changes in 
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net incomes caused by the marital dissolution. Other factors such as child custody and 
housing arrangements only affect changes in net incomes through changes in CS. 
The system of CS that was applied by the Child Support Agency (CSA) in the 
UK during our sample period of 1992-2001 was based on the principle of income-
shares, i.e. child support liability depends primarily on the net incomes of both natural 
parents, subject to deductions which include housing costs, travel-to-work costs and 
allowances for new children in the second family. Child Poverty Action Group (2000) 
and Paull, Walker and Zhu (2000) explain how the CS liability is calculated. 
For the vast majority of couples at risk of partnership dissolution in our 
sample, we do not observe what would happen to them should separation took place. 
So we make some naïve, but plausible, assumptions in our CS liability calculations: 
(1) We abstract from any labour supply and repartnership effects and assume no 
implications for travel-to-work costs; 
(2) Mother gets custody of all children (and so is referred to the Parent with Care 
(PWC)) and stays in the original house; 
(3) Father becomes the non-resident parent (NRP) moves to a rented apartment, 
with rent set at the median of all rented housing of the region in that year; 
(4) Both PWC and NRP’s welfare benefit entitlements are reassessed on 
separation under the assumptions given by (1)-(3); 
(5) Finally, CS liability is calculated under the system of child support described 
above, based on observed earnings and hours, observed/imputed housing costs for 
the NRP/PWC and predicted welfare benefit receipts from step (4). 
(6) We only include contemporaneous child support liability in the partnership 
dissolution model, so we are implicitly assuming NRPs are myopic. In principle, 
we should use instead the present value of the total child support liabilities for 
each NRP, which also depends on his discount rate and age structure of the 
qualifying children (recall that child support payment ceases when a qualifying 
child reaches 16, or up to 18 if he/she stays on school) and even on the CS liability 
associated with planned, but yet unborn, children. We reserve this extension for 
further work. 
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While these assumptions are obviously abstractions, we would argue that the 
child support liability, and implied entitlement, derived in this way could be regarded 
by partners as a reasonable expectation resulting from a simple rule-of-thumb.  
Using the official equivalence scales we then calculate the equalised net 
incomes pre and post partnership dissolution for the sub-sample of couples with 
qualifying children (N=8856), which accounts for almost half of the whole sample. 
Table 4 decomposes household incomes into earnings, benefit income and other 
incomes for both partners pre and post separation. It also shows equivalised incomes 
for PWC and NRP pre and post separation, using before housing cost (BHC) and after 
housing cost (AHC) scales. We can see couples with dependent children in our 
sample have a mean weekly total net income of £463 in January 2004 prices, with 
22.6% and 66.8% coming from women and men’s labour income respectively, 8.9% 
from benefits and 1.7% from all other income. With a mean equivalence scale of 1.41, 
this results in an equivalised income of £328 for the family before housing cost. After 
deducting the housing costs with a mean of £75 and using the alternative equivalence 
scale, we get a mean equivalised income of £275 after housing cost. 
Table 4:  Mean equivalised household incomes for PWC (and children) and 
NRP pre and post separation, by sources of income, BHC and AHC  
 Mother with children Non-resident father 
 Amount % Amount % 
Pre-separation:     
Own Net earnings 104.71 22.6 309.18 66.8 
   Partner’s net earning 309.18 66.8 104.71 22.6 
Total net benefit 41.09 8.9 41.09 8.9 
Other income 7.80 1.7 7.80 1.7 
Total net income 462.78 100.0 462.78 100.0 
Equivalence scale (BHC) 1.41  1.41  
Equivalised income (BHC) 328.21  328.21  
Equivalence scale (AHC) 1.41  1.41  
Housing cost 75.34  75.34  
Equivalised income (AHC) 274.78  274.78  
Post-separation:     
   Own Net earnings 104.71 41.8 309.18 120.2 
Partner’s net earning -  -  
Total net benefit 110.41 44.1 12.74 5.0 
Other income 2.17 0.9 5.62 2.2 
Child support 32.97 13.2 -70.26 -27.3 
Total net income 250.26 100.0 257.28 100.0 
Equivalence scale (BHC) 1.02  0.61  
 16
Equivalised income (BHC) 245.35  421.77  
Housing cost 75.34  37.73  
Equivalence scale (AHC) 0.96  0.55  
Equivalised income (AHC) 182.21  399.18  
Note: AHC = after housing costs, BHC = before housing costs 
The PWC and the children will suffer a loss of equivalised income in the 
magnitude of 25% or 34% on average, depending on whether we use the BHC or 
AHC measure, despite a 170% increase in total social security transfers and full 
compliance of child support of the NRPs. Note that PWCs only benefit from less than 
half of the child support paid by the NRPs, due to the fact that the income support 
system imposes a 100% tax on all child support receipts. On the other hand, NRPs 
seem to be better off on both BHC and AHC measures of equivalised income post 
separation, with a net gain in the magnitude of 30%-45%.    
7. Estimation Results 
We start by re-estimating the Böheim and Ermisch (2001) specification, 
including their “surprise” variables, as the baseline model5. To facilitate comparison, 
we replicate, in column 1 of Table 5, the results of their main model6. Column 2 
represents an attempt to replicate their results using all eleven waves of BHPS data 
now available, instead of just the original eight. Unsurprisingly, the two sets of results 
including goodness of fit measures, are remarkably similar, with perhaps the 
exception of the coefficients of labour incomes which are insignificant in any case7. In 
the last column we apply the same model specification to the wider sample of couples 
which also include couples without dependent children. It is worth noting that the fit 
measures improve significantly as a result of the sample size more than doubling. 
This baseline specification include partnership characteristics, age differences 
between partners, employment and unemployment dummies and the net weekly 
earnings of each partner, as well as financial “surprises”. The estimation results 
suggest that cohabiting couples are more likely to separate than legally married 
couples, but the difference is nowhere near that suggested by simple correlation in 
 
5  The alternative specification with the financial change variable in t-1 as a measure of new 
information yields statistically insignificant coefficients on the financial change dummies. 
6 See Böheim and Ermisch (2001), page 204. 
7 The differences in magnitude presumably reflect the differences in the units of measurement. 
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Table 1. The number of previous marriages also increases the risk. In line with the 
theoretical predictions, women who started relationship later are less likely to separate 
while the probability of partnership dissolution also declines with the duration of the 
relationship. Consistent with the hypothesis of sorting, partners with the same race,  
Table 5: Comparing with the Böheim and Ermisch (2001) results  
 Böheim  and 
Ermisch sample 
Waves 1-8 
Böheim  and 
Ermisch sample 
but  11 waves 
Böheim  and 
Ermisch  
Full sample 
Partnership characteristics (at t-1): 
  Cohabiting 0.625 (0.171) 0.400 (0.128) 0.356 (0.079) 
  Number of ex-marriages 0.188 (0.110) 0.073 (0.131) 0.254 (0.083) 
  Age at start of partnership -0.043 (0.010) -0.045 (0.012) -0.036 (0.007) 
  Log duration of partnership  -0.307 (0.078) -0.449 (0.085) -0.394 (0.037) 
  Partners  same ethnic group 0.293 (0.373) -0.720 (0.149) -0.553 (0.116) 
  Partners have same religion 0.186 (0.090) -0.073 (0.072) -0.090 (0.053) 
  Partners not religious -0.040 (0.091) 0.029 (0.074) 0.078 (0.054) 
  Youngest child <5 years -0.346 (0.110) -0.173 (0.090) -0.161 (0.069) 
  Number of children 0.098 (0.049) 0.106 (0.042) 0.104 (0.026) 
  Partners different education 0.055 (0.093) 0.051 (0.083) 0.027 (0.060) 
Age difference 
  Woman 5+ years older 0.385 (0.254) 0.495 (0.203) 0.326 (0.146) 
  Woman 3-5 years older 0.543 (0.217) 0.092 (0.207) -0.018 (0.151) 
  Woman 0-3 years older 0.134 (0.145) -0.040 (0.127) -0.010 (0.096) 
  Partner 2 to 4 years older 0.022 (0.118) 0.005 ( 0.117) 0.065 (0.087) 
  Partner 4+ years older 0.180 (0.115) 0.021 (0.125) -0.027 (0.094) 
Labour Market (as of t-1):    




  Partner’s labour income -0.137 (0.080) -0.00003 (0.000) -0.00004 (0.000) 
  Employed  0.367 (0.316) 0.090 (0.094) 0.084 (0.071) 
  Unemployed 0.047 (0.101) 0.272 (0.263) 0.109 (0.173) 
  Partner employed -0.005 (0.159) -0.303 (0.130) -0.097 (0.088) 
  Partner unemployed  -0.019 (0.144) -0.179 (0.159) -0.041 (0.117) 
Surprise indicators    
  Large positive surprise a a a 
  Positive surprise -0.292 (0.148) -0.149 (0.108) -0.067 (0.080) 
  Negative surprise 0.083 (0.098) 0.107 (0.082) 0.100 (0.063) 
  Large negative surprise 0.218 (0.145) 0.287 (0.123) 0.274 (0.099) 
  Missing surprise indicator - - 0.385 (0.094) 
Constant -0.925 (0.540) 0.843 (0.448) 0.169 (0.268) 
N (couple-years) 4451 6837 15262 
Chi-square (df) 103.3 (24) 144.8 (24) 342.5 (25) 
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.089 0.111 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -458.4 -694.7 -1311.6 
Akaike Information Criterion 0.2172 0.2105 0.1753 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted to allow for multiple observations per couple. Labour 
incomes are in £/Month in January 1998 prices. 
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Böheim and Ermisch (2001) sample: Couples where both partners co-reside before a dissolution and 
both are interviewed in 3 consecutive waves, the women are aged 60 or less, and at least one dependent 
child (aged 16 or less) is living in the household.  
Full sample: Böheim and Ermisch sample plus childless couples. For people experiencing multiple 
relationship dissolutions over the sample period, we only focus on the first relationship. We include all 
cases where the couples are at risk of partnership dissolution in the forthcoming year and where the 
outcome can be either directly observed or imputed with certainty. 
religion are less likely to dissolve. Having a non-religious husband does not seem to 
have an effect. The presence of a pre-school child decreases the risk of partnership 
dissolving, contrasting with the positive simple correlation. An increase in number of 
qualifying children in the family increases the risk. Age difference dummies are 
generally insignificant, except when the woman is at least five years older than the 
man. Women’s earnings significantly reduce the risk of partnership dissolution while 
her partner’s earnings do not make a difference, a result which contradicts Böheim 
and Ermisch (2001)’s findings, although their estimates are not precisely determined. 
Earlier work also suggested that women’s economic independence might 
increase the risk of partnership dissolution. “Surprise” variables do turn out to be 
significant as a whole, with couples experiencing positive shocks less likely to 
separate and couples with negative chocks much more likely to dissolve. This result 
gives strong support to the importance of new information in marital dissolution 
decisions. 
Table 6 presents five model specifications, from the most general which nests 
the Böheim and Ermisch (2001) model, to a parsimonious model from systematically 
testing-down. To facilitate model evaluation and selection, we report the change in the 
probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent continuous variable and 
the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables, rather than reporting 
coefficients of the probit model. We also report P-values instead of standard errors.    
Model 1 represents the full specification nesting the Böheim and Ermisch 
specification. For this wider sample which includes childless couples, we add 12 more 
variables to the baseline specification, including both partner’s unearned net incomes 
and working hours, an indicator for having dependent children, as well as two 
separate measures of the “empty nest effect” to the baseline specification. Most 
important of all, we include the calculated child support liability, two dummies for the 
wife’s predicted benefit status (in-work and out-of-work benefits respectively) and 
their interactions with CS. 
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The wife’s unearned income has a positive effect on the risk of partnership 
dissolution and is marginally significant, while the husband’s unearned income has 
the opposite sign but insignificant. Having any dependent children at all appears to 
increase the risk. The child support liability has a large negative effect on the hazard 
of divorce, although the benefit dummies and their interactions with child support 
liability appear to be insignificant. The post empty nest dummy, which indicates the 
departure of all children from parental homes in the sample period, is strongly 
positive. In contrast, the years since empty nest variable is negative and significant, 
with a magnitude which suggests that that the overall empty nest effect will only 
remain positive for about six years. Working hours are highly significant, with wife’s 
own hours increasing the risk and husband’s working hours reducing the risk. The 
baseline specification variables still display a similar pattern after the inclusion of new 
variables, although there is some change in the magnitude of the coefficients. Finally, 
the goodness-of-fit measures suggest that this full model represents an improvement 
over the baseline model, despite the apparent over-parameterisation8. 
Model 2 drops all variables in the baseline specification which are individually 
and jointly insignificant from Model 1. The new omitted surprise category effectively 
includes people with positive and negative surprises, as well no surprises. Model 3 
drops the statistically significant working hours from Model 3, in an attempt to reduce 
the potential multicollinearity problem of the child support variables. But still, the 
benefit type dummies and their interactions with child support are not jointly 
significant. Model 4 drops the insignificant benefit type dummies and their 
interactions with the current CS liability from Model 3 and adds back working hours. 
It turns out that the retained income support dummies also become insignificant. 
Model 5 represents the preferred parsimonious specification, after dropping all 
variables which are not significant at the 5% level, with the exception of current 
earnings and unearned incomes. This preferred specification only has just over half as 
many regressors as the previous one, with all but the current income variables 
 
8 We assume full compliance throughout our analysis although only about one third pay any CS and 
only half of those that do pay the full amount. It may be more reasonable to assume that separation 
depends on the expected liability and receipt. Omitted non-compliance is likely to be positively 
correlated with heterogeneity in the separation rate and this is likely to bias our estimates CS effect 
downwards (towards zero).  
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significant at the 5% level. This parsimonious specification also represents the best fit 
among all five specifications  according to the AIC. 
 We apply this specification to a duration model framework, which is less 
restrictive in its distributional assumptions. The Generalized Gamma Model estimates 
are presented in the first two columns of Table 7. The Generalized Gamma Model is 
extremely flexible, nesting as special cases the Weibull, the exponential, and the 
lognormal. Our Wald tests of the null that κ=1 (the Weibull distribution) has χ2(1)= 
0.44, Prob>χ2 = 0.5059, while the test of: κ=1 and σ=1 (the Exponential distribution) 
has χ2(2)=48.49, Prob>χ2=0.0000, and the null that κ=0 (the Lognormal distribution) 
has χ2(1)=7.95, Prob > χ2 = 0.0048.  Hence the Wald tests overwhelmingly reject the 
Exponential and Lognormal distributions and are strongly in favour of a Weibull 
distribution, the results of which are presented in the last two columns of Table 8. 
To facilitate easy comparison, both the Gamma and the Weibull model in 
Table 7 are fitted in the accelerated failure-time metric, in which a positive coefficient 
implies an increase in the expected time of survival. The two sets of results are 
remarkably similar, implying that the Weibull is a very good approximation of the 
more general Gamma model. Indeed, the Weibull model gives a better fit according to 
the AIC. In contrast to the discrete time model, partner’s unearned income now 
becomes significantly positive. All other coefficients retain their sign and level of 
significance in the discrete time specification. The shape parameter p is very precisely 
determined with an estimate of 0.5 indicating negative overall duration dependence 
and a rather sharp decline in the hazard of separation immediately after the formation 
of a partnership.  
 Figure 2 shows the Weibull survival functions by years of duration of 
partnership for different levels of CS liability.  From the bottom upwards, the five 
curves indicate survival rates evaluated at zero CS, one standard deviation below the 
mean, the mean CS level, and one and two standard deviations above the mean CS 
level respectively, while holding all other regressors at their mean levels. It is clear 
that the survival rates decline more rapidly in the early years of the partnership and 
for lower levels of CS. 
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 Figure 3 is an attempt to evaluate the likely impact of CS reform on 
partnership dissolution. The solid line indicates survival rates evaluated where CS=0, 
the dotted line shoes the predicted hazard function under the the new CS system 
which has only been enforced from 2003 (and hence out of our sample period), while 
the dashed line shows the predicted hazard under the CS system that prevailed from 
1993 onwards. It suggests that the introduction of mandatory CS might have had an  
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Table 6: Probit Model of Partnership Dissolution: changes in probability, P-values in parentheses 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Incomes      
Wife’s net earning (£1000/week) -0.035 (0.002) -0.037 (0.001) -0.021 (0.011) -0.035 (0.001) -0.035 (0.001) 
Partner’s net earning (£1000/week) 0.003 (0.275) 0.003 (0.280) 0.001 (0.710) 0.003 (0.323) 0.002 (0.485) 
Wife’s Unearned Income – (£1000/wk) 0.024 (0.179) 0.026 (0.148) 0.025 (0.148) 0.022 (0.211) 0.020 (0.281) 
Partner’s Unearned Income –(£1000/wk) -0.022 (0.183) -0.024 (0.139) -0.017 (0.257) -0.024 (0.137) -0.025 (0.129) 
Child support related variables      
Indicator for qualifying children 0.006 (0.068) 0.007 (0.066) 0.007 (0.072) 0.004 (0.221)  
Current CS liability (£1000/wk) -0.110 (0.017) -0.113 (0.016) -0.135 (0.006) -0.067 (0.019) -0.058 (0.025) 
Indicator for wife on IS if divorced -0.003 (0.370) -0.003 (0.326) -0.005 (0.082) -0.001 (0.670)  
CS*Indicator for wife on IS if divorced 0.040 (0.418) 0.045 (0.371) 0.052 (0.323)   
Indicator for wife on FC if divorced -0.004 (0.268) -0.004 (0.270) -0.004 (0.406)   
CS*Indicator for wife on FC if divorced 0.082 (0.204) 0.081 (0.217) 0.086 (0.229)   
Characteristics      
Empty Nest dummy 0.036 (0.002) 0.039 (0.002) 0.040 (0.001) 0.039 (0.002) 0.036 (0.003) 
Years since empty nest -0.006 (0.017) -0.006 (0.015) -0.006 (0.011) -0.006 (0.015) -0.006 (0.016) 
Own working hours/week 0.0002 (0.003) 0.0002 (0.003)  0.0002 (0.003) 0.0003 (0.000) 
Partner’s working hours/week -0.0001 (0.004) -0.0001 (0.002)  -0.0001 (0.002) -0.0001 (0.002) 
  Cohabiting 0.015 (0.000) 0.015 (0.000) 0.016 (0.000) 0.015 (0.000) 0.015 (0.000) 
  Number of ex-marriages 0.007 (0.004) 0.007 (0.005) 0.008 (0.004) 0.007 (0.005) 0.008 (0.004) 
  Age at start of partnership -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) 
  Log duration of partnership -0.012 (0.000) -0.012 (0.000) -0.013 (0.000) -0.012 (0.000) -0.011 (0.000) 
  Partners from same ethnic group -0.030 (0.000) -0.031 (0.000) -0.033 (0.000) -0.032 (0.000) -0.033 (0.000) 
  Partners have same religion -0.003 (0.100)     
  Partners not religious 0.002 (0.179)     
  Youngest child <5 years -0.004 (0.034) -0.004 (0.030) -0.005 (0.014) -0.004 (0.032)  
  Number of qualifying children 0.003 (0.005) 0.003 (0.006) 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.000) 
  Partners have different education 0.001 (0.733)     
Age difference      
  Woman more than 5 years older 0.012 (0.039) 0.012 (0.016) 0.013 (0.013) 0.013 (0.015) 0.013 (0.015) 
  Woman 3-5 years older -0.000 (0.914)     
  Woman 0-3 years older -0.000 (0.890)     
 23
  Partner 2 to 4 years older 0.002 (0.437)     
  Partner more than 4 years older -0.001 (0.862)     
Labour Market (as of t-1):      
  Employed -0.001 (0.815)     
  Unemployed 0.005 (0.449)     
  Partner employed -0.000 (0.948)     
  Partner unemployed -0.002 (0.498)     
Surprise indicators      
  Large positive surprise a a a a a 
  Positive surprise -0.002 (0.471)     
  Negative surprise 0.003 (0.124)     
  Large negative surprise 0.012 (0.004) 0.011 (0.005) 0.011 (0.007) 0.011 (0.006) 0.011 (0.006) 
  Missing surprise indicator 0.015 (0.000) 0.015 (0.000) 0.016 (0.000) 0.015 (0.000) 0.016 (0.000) 
N (couple-years) 15262 15262 15262 15262 15262 
Chi-square (df) 392.28 (37) 365.15 (24) 351.52 (22) 363.73 (21) 351.17 (18) 
Pseudo R2 0.1235 0.1192 0.1135 0.1185 0.1168 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -1293.5 -1299.9 -1308.3 -1300.9 -1303.5 
Akaike Information Criterion 0.1745 0.1736 0.1744 0.1734 0.1733 
Note: Rather than reporting coefficients, we report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the 
discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. P-values in parentheses are adjusted to allow for multiple observations per couple. 
a) All 255 women with large positive surprises continue their partnership in the forthcoming year, hence this variable is dropped from the estimation 
b) AIC = 2(-lnL+k)/n where lnL is the log-likelihood, k is the number of parameters and n is the sample size. A lower AIC implies a better fit (Maddala (2004) p488). 
Model 1: Full specification nesting the Böheim and Ermisch specification (indicator for planned but not yet born children, education for both partners, and housing costs pre 
and post separation are statistically insignificant and have already been left out). 
Model 2: Dropping religion dummies, different education dummy, insignificant age difference dummies, and employment status dummies and insignificant surprise 
indicators from Model 1. The new omitted surprise category effectively includes people with positive and negative surprises, as well no surprises.  
Model 3: Dropping (statistically significant) working hours from Model 3, in an attempt to reduce collinearity of the CS variables. 
Model 4: Dropping statistically significant benefit type dummies and their interactions with the current CS liability from Model 3 and adding back working hours 
Model 5: Dropping partner’s observed income, indicator for having qualifying children and indicator for children under 5 from Model 4. 
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Table 7: The Generalized Gamma and the Weibull Models: 
 Generalized 
Gamma Model Weibull Model 
 Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value 
Income     
Wife’s net earning (£1000/week) 4.614 0.004 4.338 0.004 
Partner’s net earning (£1000/week) -0.167 0.706 -0.166 0.696 
Wife’s Unearned Income (£1000/week) -2.667 0.303 -2.576 0.308 
Partner’s Unearned Income (£1000/week) 5.306 0.042 5.310 0.043 
Current CS liability (£1000/week) 8.646 0.022 8.747 0.020 
Partnership characteristics     
Empty nest dummy -2.400 0.018 -2.298 0.016 
Years since empty nest 0.887 0.026 0.862 0.023 
Own working hours/week -0.037 0.001 -0.035 0.000 
Partner’s working hours/week 0.019 0.009 0.018 0.011 
Cohabiting -1.799 0.000 -1.754 0.000 
Number of ex-marriages -0.973 0.008 -0.952 0.009 
Age at start of partnership 0.124 0.000 0.124 0.000 
Partners from same ethnic group 2.291 0.000 2.205 0.000 
Number of qualifying children -0.602 0.000 0.591 0.000 
Woman more than 5 years older -1.266 0.025 -1.341 0.000 
Surprise indicators     
Large positive surprise 25.599 0.000 27.054 0.000 
Large negative surprise -1.074 0.008 -1.051 0.008 
Missing surprise indicator -1.321 0.002 -1.295 0.002 
Constant -0.506 0.620 -0.345 0.734 
lnσ 0.692 0.000 - - 
κ 0.809 0.005 - - 
P - - 0.504 0.000 
N (couple-years) 15501 15501 
Chi-square (df) 139.88 (18) 164.29 (18) 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -672.5 -672.8 
Akaike Information Criterion 0.0895 0.0894 
 
(unintended) impact on the divorce rate, potentially reducing the divorce probability 
by around 10% for a 20 year old marriage if all child supports liabilities are fully 
enforced. On the other hand, the latest reform seems likely to reverse the trend, at 
least partially, through reducing typical child support liabilities. These results are 
broadly consistent with our simple simulation results which suggest that the 
introduction of CS (compared to no CS at all -  which was quite typical prior to 1993) 
has increased the instantaneous hazard by around 14.5% over what we predict it 
would have been  while the new CS reform will decrease the hazard, from the peak 
level, by about 2%. 
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8. Simulating CS Design Effects on Separation 
We have shown that our econometric results suggest important CS effects on 
separation. In the UK the CS system has been reformed from a system based on the 
income of both the households of both separated parents to one where liability is 
based entirely on the income of the NRP (usually the father). In the USA many states 
have a system based on NRP income while the others use a weighted sum of both 
incomes. Here we take a stylised system where the CS liability of the NRP is 
determined by the weighted average of both parent's net incomes9, and we then vary 
the weights while fixing the expected value of total amount of CS liability at some 
level. That is, we assume the system is given by ( ) .   (1- ).i f mCS b a y a y= +  where 
b is a scale parameter indicating the generosity of the CS system, while a is the 
parameter that weights the separated parents together10.  Thus a=0 implies that CS 
liability is independent of  the PWC’s income while a=0.5 implies that  the NRP’s 
liability falls by 50% of an increase in PWC’s income.  
Figure 4 shows the amount of CS contribution from the NRP to the PWC as 
the weight attached to PWC’s income rises. Figure 5 shows the CS contribution from 
the NRP to the PWC as a percentage of NRP and PWC’s actual net earnings. Both 
figures are drawn for varying weights of the NRP’s CS liability (i.e. value of 
parameter a). The two figures suggest that a system which is based entirely on NRP’s 
net earnings would result in a weekly liability of £71.50 per week for the father, 
which amounts to 22.8% of his actual net earnings. However, if the system was based 
on the unweighted sum of both parents’ earnings, holding the level of total CS 
liability constant, the NRP’s liability would be reduced to £53.1 per week, or 16.9% 
of their respective net earnings, with the PWC (notionally) contributing an equal share 
of (typically) her net earnings to make up the balance. 
Figure 6 shows the predicted effects of parameter a on the survival rate 
evaluated at the mean liability. For example, the probability of surviving to 10 year is 
approximately 6% higher if a=0 compared to a=0.5. This corresponds to an 
 
9 Of course, in practice CS formulae may be more complicated – as the UK one was. The new UK 
formula has a=0 but b(yf) is piecewise linear. 
10 Applying OLS to the sample of BHPS separated couples reveals that, for the UK in the mid to late 
1990’s, b=0.213 and a=0.812. 
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instantaneous separation rates of 1.60% if a=0 compared to 1.73% for a system that 
was based on the unweighted sum of both parents’ incomes, holding the level of CS 
liability constant. 
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9. Conclusions 
 This paper studies the determinants of partnership dissolution in the UK using 
the British Household Panel Study (BHPS). After allowing for heterogeneity in 
partnership characteristics, we still find couples to be highly responsive to changes in 
economic circumstances in deciding whether to continue their partnership. In line 
with previous studies we find that new information with regard to household finances 
have a substantial impact on the probability of partnership dissolution. Moreover, we 
exploit the variation in child support liabilities, driven by an important policy reform, 
to separately identify the effects of children in the household from the effect of child 
support liability. We find there is very strong evidence that an increase in the implied 
child support liabilities significantly reduces the dissolution risk while an increase in 
the wife’s current earnings has the opposite effect. Moreover, we find the departure of 
all children (an empty nest) has a large positive effect. 
 We use the estimates to simulate the effect of CS on separation rates. We 
calculate that divorce rate would have been 14.5% higher (i.e. 2.16% instead of 
1.85%) were it not for the introduction of a CS formula in the UK, and that the very 
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recent reform which has reduced typical liabilities may well modestly increase the 
separation rate from 1.85% to 1.89%.  
 We also use the estimates to simulate the effect of alternative CS designs – we 
find that a system which is based entirely on the non-resident parent’s income would 
result in a separation rate of 1.60% compared to 1.73% for a system that was based on 
the unweighted sum of both parents’ incomes, holding the level of CS liability 
constant. 
 A natural extension in the future could take into account the labour supply and 
repartnership effects of dissolved couples, using the matched parent-with-care and 
non-resident-parent sample11. The assumptions of no labour supply or repartnership 
effects are maintained hypotheses could also be tested12. But despite our reservations 
about these assumptions we believe these existing findings do have significant policy 
implications. For instance, our results suggest that the current child support reform 
(Department of Social Security (1999)), and the CS pass-through that has been a 
feature of CS design in some US states, might have effects on divorce rates through 
changing child support liabilities and receipts that are largely unintended. 
Finally, while we have concentrated on the effect of CS on partnership 
dissolution we have not discussed the implications for the welfare of the parties 
concerned. It is unclear that, by holding together a partnership that would otherwise 
dissolve, welfare of all parties has improved. There is little research on the impact of 
separation on well-being and further research needs to be done to separate out the 
effects of separation from its financial consequences, especially on outcomes for 
children, including their well-being. 
 
11 Currently the sample in BHPS with matched separated mother-father information, is probably too 
small to support such work, although we anticipate that would be possible after a few more waves. 
12 The Appendix shows how the working and repartnership behaviour of the partners varies up to and 
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<=-4 139.6 139.6 43.7 43.7 83.6 56.8   
-3 136.7 136.7 43.0 43.0 88.6 62.0   
-2 130.1 130.1 40.2 40.2 87.0 65.2   
-1 141.9 141.9 34.2 34.2 86.7 58.3   
0 142.8 142.8 31.3 31.3 84.7 58.0   
1 171.0 98.3 34.6 59.1 85.0 56.7 22.8 20.5 
2 187.1 116.6 28.8 49.0 81.7 57.7 29.8 21.2 
3 191.3 131.9 32.6 47.2 86.5 53.9 29.2 21.3 
4 209.1 136.7 21.1 44.7 82.9 48.7 38.2 32.9 
>=5 229.1 166.7 19.9 24.0 91.1 62.3 55.5 35.6 
Total 167.1 135.1 33.2 41.0 85.8 58.2   
 
 
 
